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Abstract
This study introduces a novel methodology for consciousness science. Consciousness as we understand it pretheoretically
is inherently subjective, yet the data available to science are irreducibly intersubjective. This poses a unique challenge for
attempts to investigate consciousness empirically. We meet this challenge by combining two insights. First, we emphasize
the role that computational models play in integrating results relevant to consciousness from across the cognitive sciences.
This move echoes Alan Newell’s call that the language and concepts of computer science serve as a lingua franca for integra-
tive cognitive science. Second, our central contribution is a new method for validating computational models that treats
them as providing negative data on consciousness: data about what consciousness is not. This method is designed to support
a quantitative science of consciousness while avoiding metaphysical commitments. We discuss how this methodology
applies to current and future research and address questions that others have raised.
Keywords: computationalism; consciousness; evidence; functionalism; methodology; modeling
Introduction
“Consciousness science” is an oxymoron. On the one hand, a
defining feature of consciousness is its subjective character,
which we each access directly through personal experience; on
the other hand, the empirical sciences demand that data be in-
tersubjectively accessible and reproducible, effectively factoring
out the personal and subjective. Paradoxically, then, the feature
that distinguishes consciousness as a natural phenomenon
must be absent from the data of consciousness science (Nagel
1986; Chalmers 2010; Overgaard 2015). Despite the recent explo-
sion of empirical and theoretical work on consciousness, this
paradox has yet to be adequately resolved.1 This paper proposes
a new method for validating models in consciousness science
that solves this problem. After motivating the method and its
key commitments, we re-evaluate existing research in terms of
our methodology and respond to a number of objections.
Apophatic science in brief
The key insight we aim to defend is that models need not inves-
tigate an explanatory target “from within,” by exemplifying or
instantiating that target. They may also circumscribe a target of
explanation “from without,” by ruling out putative explanations
of the target. By generating increasingly sophisticated models of
cognitive agents that lack consciousness, we learn more about
what consciousness is not, and consequently, more about
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1 Signs of this explosion include the proliferation of high-profile survey
articles (Koch 2018; Sohn 2019), special issues such as Fazekas and
Overgaard (2018) or Chella et al. (2019), and new journals, like
Neuroscience of Consciousness and Psychology of Consciousness: Theory,
Research, and Practice.
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consciousness itself. While this claim may appear counterintui-
tive, we argue that the structure of this research program is di-
rectly analogous to that found in paradigmatic quantitative
sciences, such as fundamental physics. The true test of an ex-
planatory and scientific research program is that it leads to in-
creasingly precise models and passes increasingly rigorous
evidential tests. The method we suggest conforms to this pat-
tern and thus may ground a rigorous and quantitative science
of consciousness.
Cheekily, we have christened this method apophatic, in refer-
ence to apophatic or negative theology (Putnam 1997). Faced
with the task of understanding a divine entity, in principle inac-
cessible to human comprehension, apophatic theology pro-
ceeds by elucidating those features which God is not, thereby
carving out a negative characterization. Likewise, conscious-
ness exhibits essential features that are intersubjectively inac-
cessible, and apophatic science proceeds by systematically
exploring models that fail to capture these features, thereby re-
futing through successful simulation insufficient accounts of
consciousness. The analogy breaks down in several ways, how-
ever. Whereas God may be entirely inaccessible, consciousness
is partially accessible through a wide variety of experimental
paradigms. Whereas apophatic theology is used to produce sub-
jective mystical states, apophatic science aims to produce inter-
subjectively verifiable empirical knowledge. Crucially, we
demand that a negative characterization of consciousness be
evaluable by quantitative measures such as its fit to empirical
data.
Modeling front and center
Apophatic consciousness science gives models pride of place.
Inquiry is structured as follows: (i) procedures such as func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG), and the recording of verbal report and behavioral
response are used to collect data on phenomena related to con-
sciousness; (ii) these data are summarized in mechanistic
descriptions, theories, or models validated through ordinary
techniques; and then (iii) these piecemeal models are integrated
within a computational simulation or robotic embodiment that
instantiates the relevant mechanisms and reproduces target
behaviors. On our view, only step (iii) addresses consciousness
tout court, and the new method for model validation applies
only here, not elsewhere in the cognitive sciences. The chal-
lenge for consciousness science is to find a model genuinely tar-
geted on subjective experience that can nevertheless be
improved in response to intersubjective data. Apophatic model
validation is a new way to assess a model’s relevance to con-
sciousness and to iteratively improve the model through com-
parisons with data.
Methodology not metaphysics
We stress that this project concerns the methodology of con-
sciousness science: what are the right methods for studying con-
sciousness empirically, and how may these methods be justified?
Although our discussion will necessarily intersect with issues in
the philosophy of consciousness, this is not a project in episte-
mology or metaphysics. For instance, we are not advocating
mysterianism, the view that the relationship between conscious-
ness and matter is somehow forever inaccessible to human un-
derstanding (McGinn 1989). That claim concerns understanding
in principle and across all modes of inquiry. In contrast, we are
concerned with the technical roles of intersubjective data and
computational models in studying subjective phenomena.
Likewise, we take no stance on whether conscious experience
reduces to functional or physical properties of its neural
substrate.
Although we remain agnostic on these questions, we must
engage them in a limited way, as the metaphysical commit-
ments of consciousness scientists have influenced their meth-
odology. For instance, endorsing eliminativism or reductionism
(often and implicitly) permits one to deny the subjective charac-
ter of experience and to assert that models of “access con-
sciousness” make direct progress on consciousness proper
(Block 1995). Conversely, metaphysical and epistemological
arguments by philosophers have been used to cast doubt on the
explanatory relevance of consciousness science to phenomenal
consciousness, identifying a uniquely “hard” why-question
about consciousness intractable to empirical methods
(Chalmers 1996). Our goal is a method that can make genuine
progress on the scientific understanding of consciousness with-
out taking a side in this debate.
Computationalism and Explanatory Unity
This methodological project is grounded in two constraints on a
satisfactory account of consciousness. First, we prioritize ex-
planatory unity. Consciousness permeates human experience,
and accounts that separately explain listening-to-beeps-con-
sciousness, looking-at-squares-consciousness, reading-instruc-
tions-consciousness, Stroop-task-consciousness, car-driving-
consciousness, and so on are inadequate to capture this perva-
sive nature. Although we may learn from such isolated explana-
tions, the goal should always be an integrated theory that
covers all consciousness-relevant phenomena: those behaviors,
mechanisms, and scenarios identified as involving conscious-
ness by disciplines across the cognitive sciences. Second, we
embrace the methods of computational model building, which
we take (without argument) to be uniquely suited to this task.
More specifically, our own research aims to develop artificial,
intelligent, human-like agents, and we conjecture that at a min-
imum, agency requires some feature to play the functional role
of a conscious and unconscious divide (Bello and Bridewell
2017). These two constraints are drawn from Allen Newell’s
original program for computationalism: the simulation of in-
creasingly realistic behavior by empirically informed models
(Newell 1973).
Newell initially proposed the methods of computationalism
as a framework for integrating diverse types of evidence from
across the cognitive sciences into coherent explanations.
Consider his (1973) comments on the state of psychology in the
paper “You Can’t Play 20 Questions with Nature and Win,”
where he laments, “We never seem in the experimental litera-
ture to put the results of all the experiments together,” conclud-
ing that, when studying the human subject, “the ‘normal’
means of science may not suffice” (298–9). Newell was driven by
the apparent heterogeneity and lack of unification across the
laundry list of empirical results presented at a prominent sym-
posium on cognition. While he found each result intriguing, he
questioned whether the mere amalgamation of “effects” consti-
tutes a genuine increase in knowledge.
Newell’s positive suggestion was that the information proc-
essing perspective could serve as the critical “glue” for binding
diverse empirical results in cognitive psychology together
within a unified framework. Researchers were to build
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complete, computational models of complex tasks or to develop
wholesale “cognitive architectures” that could take instructions
as input and execute a task in the same manner as human sub-
jects. Newell does not speak specifically of consciousness, but
he is interested in unifying results in cognitive psychology un-
der a single theory that will capture “the essential structure of
the mind” (ibid., 306).2 Accordingly, computer science was to
play a critical role in Newell’s vision by providing a lingua franca
for stating comprehensive theories of the control structures un-
derlying human behavior. While his call has had limited trac-
tion in the cognitive sciences,3 we think that this methodological
computationalism is a promising approach to developing progres-
sively expansive and integrated models that provide a unified
account of conscious experience.
The Challenge of Modeling Consciousness
Applied to consciousness, methodological computationalism
aims to construct integrated models of consciousness-relevant
phenomena and to iteratively improve them in response to em-
pirical data. As in any modeling effort, this project requires a
way to validate a model (i.e., to ensure it is targeted at con-
sciousness proper) and a way to guide its systematic improve-
ment. These requirements are connected in that model
improvements are often inspired by a failure to satisfactorily ac-
count for data. Instances of this standard modeling procedure
can be found in discussions of physics (Hesse 1962; Smith 2014),
biology and the cognitive sciences (Bechtel 2008; Bechtel and
Abrahamsen 2010), and other fields (Morgan 2012; Currie 2018;
Weisberg 2018). The unique empirical challenge of conscious-
ness science is that consciousness is constitutively subjective,
yet empirical data must be intersubjectively accessible
(Chalmers 2010, Chapter 2; Overgaard 2015). We claim that there
is a way to overcome this challenge in order to pursue a re-
search program centered on computational models of con-
sciousness. Before describing our solution, we look at this
concern in closer detail.
Confronting the hill of subjectivity
Skeptical arguments on the role of intersubjective data in con-
sciousness science are common, so we only briefly rehearse the
main points here. The qualitative discontinuity between subjec-
tive phenomenal character and intersubjective data is perhaps
most clear in the case of neurological data. We agree that mod-
els may be validated against data on the neural correlates of
consciousness by checking for functional correspondence be-
tween their components and corresponding neural targets. For
instance, Anderson (2005) compares a computational model of
algebraic problem solving with neuroscientific evidence from
subjects engaged in algebraic reasoning. Yet the fit between
Anderson’s model and neural data cannot validate the model as
conscious.4 The most that fitting such data can do is validate a
model as implementing or predicting correlates of consciousness,
and this is precisely because we lack a theory of the causal rela-
tionship between neural correlates and consciousness itself
(Chalmers 1995).
This argument extends to every method of gathering data
about consciousness. Consider results on “reconstructing visual
experience” from neural data (Haynes 2009); for instance,
Nishimoto et al. (2011) report on the ability to generate images
from fMRI data of a person watching a video. Their model is val-
idated by checking the fit between the images it generates and
the stimulus image, a procedure that explicitly detours around
the subjective character of experience. Recently popular “no-
report” paradigms (Tsuchiya et al. 2015) fare no better, testing
for patterns of neural activity presumed to be correlated with
consciousness, but confirmed only through functional analysis
(Phillips 2018). Finally, in the case of verbal reports, we agree
that they provide data relevant to consciousness (Dennett 2003),
but as Chalmers (2018) emphasizes, they remain at best a super-
ficial expression of the real explanandum, the consciousness-
driven disposition to report. That is, people may be disposed to
make a large number of verbal reports even though they even-
tually make only one, which may be specific to a current prompt
or goal. As a result, the relationship between the report and the
richness of the underlying conscious state is too tenuous for
empirical validation.
Our purpose in rehearsing these well-known skeptical chal-
lenges for an empirical science of consciousness is not to de-
fend pessimism, but merely to make vivid the obstacle to
traditional methods of model validation. If we are dissatisfied
with targeting only the correlates of consciousness, what re-
course do we then have?
Imagining Sisyphus happy
We see two paths to bridging the gap between models of con-
sciousness and correlational data. On the first path, one facili-
tates model validation by adopting a strong metaphysical view
toward consciousness, but this comes with (we think unaccept-
able) explanatory costs. On the second, rockier path, one embra-
ces metaphysical agnosticism, but then must grapple with the
question of how models may be validated without the possibility
of confirmatory data. This move, we claim, is the more promising
one although it requires the introduction of a novel methodology.
If a modeler directly identifies consciousness with intersub-
jectively available phenomena they can validate their model as
conscious. However, by stipulating that “consciousness” is in-
tersubjectively accessible after all, they thereby sever any evi-
dential link between empirical data and our pre-theoretical
understanding of the explanandum of consciousness science.
This is an in-principle point, applying not only to functional-
ism,5 historically the preferred account of consciousness for
2 The idea that understanding consciousness may require modeling
the system as a whole, beyond any isolated, high-level structural
component, has echoes in Dennett’s (1978) call to model “the whole
iguana,” and in recent challenges to coarse-grained functionalism
that suggest low-level features may be just as relevant to conscious-
ness as high-level ones (Godfrey-Smith 2016; Chirimuuta 2018).
3 We are not the only ones who advocate a return to Newell’s project;
van Rooij and Baggio (2021) defend a return to Newell’s methodologi-
cal computationalism, and especially the emphasis on unification
and the power of computational models to generate quantitative pre-
dictions, as an appropriate response to the replication crisis in
psychology.
4 Anderson (2007) claims that his cognitive architecture, ACT-R, is con-
scious, on the grounds that implementing a version of Global
Workspace Theory makes something conscious. To his credit, he
appears dissatisfied with this qualified assertion when he writes, “It
still is not clear to me how invoking the concept of consciousness
adds to the understanding of the human mind” (Anderson 2007, 246).
5 There is a wide variety of different flavors of functionalism (Levin
2018), and strictly speaking it may be adopted as a theory of meaning
for psychological terms without pairing that with a reductionist ontol-
ogy. Here, we gloss over those subtleties in order to focus on the
coarse implications of this whole family of views for consciousness
science.
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computationalists, but also to biological materialism (Searle
1992) and panpsychism (Nagel 1979; Seager 2019). Validating a
model by committing to any of these views renders model eval-
uation a Pyrrhic gesture, as it blocks the possibility of iterative
progress toward an explanation of subjective experience.
Instead, progress is made toward explaining whatever stand-in
for that experience is stipulated by the theoretical view. The sit-
uation is even worse for metaphysical positions that assert that
consciousness is irreducibly mysterious (McGinn 1989) or that it
inhabits an empirically inaccessible realm, such as the dualism
of Descartes, since they relinquish any possibility for model
validation.
In contrast, agnosticism toward the metaphysics of con-
sciousness at least avoids immediately rendering validation
Pyrrhic or impossible, but a methodology for metaphysical ag-
nosticism is far from obvious. Naı̈ve agnosticism about whether
any model itself instantiates consciousness is a nonstarter.
Suppose someone builds a robot whose software architecture
implements the Global Workspace Theory of consciousness
(GWT; Baars 1997). True-believer GWT-functionalists assert that
the robot is conscious, biological materialists and dualists assert
it is not, and agnostics simply shrug their shoulders and refuse
judgment. The naı̈ve agnostic response is worse than unhelpful
because it closes off any route for iterative model improvement.
If no features of a model are deemed relevant to its status as
conscious—as indeed must be the case for the true agnostic—
then how can there be a systematic procedure for revising a
model in response to evidence? If an agnostic wants to assess
one model of consciousness as better than another, then they
must be prepared to treat, at least provisionally, some features
of models or their behavior as responsive to intersubjectively
available empirical data in a consciousness-relevant way. The
metaphysical agnostic needs a methodological principle for im-
proving models of conscious agents that turns agnosticism into
an evidential tool, permitting a monotonic progression of model
improvement.
Consciousness science needs a metaphysically agnostic, but
methodologically substantive perspective: an approach that can
validate models as targeted at consciousness without relying
foundationally on any position in the metaphysical debate
about consciousness, thereby serving physicalists, dualists, and
panpsychists equally. To be successful, this approach must en-
sure not only that a model is targeted at consciousness as an
explanandum but also that it is susceptible to iterative improve-
ment through comparison with empirical results. Apophatic
model validation fulfills both criteria.
The Apophatic Method
Typically, models are expected to produce output that corre-
sponds to data measured in the world. If there is a hidden entity
or process, x, driving the production of those data, we refer to
them as x-relevant. Crucially, models of x-relevant data need
not represent or reproduce x itself. For instance, computational
models of the climate do not produce a miniature climate, they
produce output that corresponds to climate-relevant data.
Likewise, computational models that target consciousness as
their explanandum do not need to produce consciousness to
generate consciousness-relevant output.
Moving from the observation that successful models need not
reproduce consciousness, to the provisional stipulation that
they cannot, motivates a new methodology for model validation
that supports iterative improvement: apophatic model validation.
In this paradigm, models act as negative data: evidence that the
theoretical principles encoded in a model of consciousness-rel-
evant phenomena are insufficient for explaining consciousness.
A model may nevertheless be assessed as an improvement over
its predecessor if it reproduces more consciousness-relevant
data. A sequence of “insufficient” models that each improves
on their predecessors delimits the boundaries of consciousness
from without, systematically probing its power to resist compu-
tational simulation.
A science of consciousness for the metaphysically
agnostic
The apophatic method combines Newell’s methodological com-
putationalism with apophatic model validation. The core ap-
proach is in line with Newell: build a series of models that
accounts for an increasing number of consciousness-relevant
phenomena with increasing levels of fidelity to the mechanisms
suspected of enabling human consciousness. The apophatic
twist is that each model is validated according to the methodo-
logical assumption that consciousness does not result from in-
formation processing. In other words, a model is always
inadequate, and the mechanisms that it implements are
deemed insufficient for explaining consciousness. Researchers
chip away at theoretical claims about consciousness-relevant
phenomena through computational implementation, reporting
“still not conscious” as their models increase in detail. The re-
sult is a research program that continually reports “not this, not
that” about the underlying claims, challenging theorists to com-
mit to increasingly specific hypotheses and pushing them away
from dogmatic or vague assertions.
We offer apophatic model validation as a methodology that
remains agnostic on the metaphysical questions of conscious-
ness. It grants the long-standing philosophical criticisms of
functionalism and its physicalist cousins (Descartes 1633;
Leibniz 1714; Searle 1980; Chalmers 1996) that functionalism
closes the gap between subjective experience and intersubjec-
tive data through a stipulation that renders models inadequate
for targeting consciousness as we understand it pre-theoreti-
cally. Yet we do not accept the defeatist conclusion that compu-
tational methods are irrelevant for studying consciousness
proper. Nor is the negative evaluation of models as “still not
conscious” grounded in an anti-functionalist metaphysics. We
do not assume dualism, for instance, or biological materialism,
either of which would imply the conclusion that no model is
conscious, at the cost of making progress in modeling con-
sciousness impossible.
Rather, the methodological claim that no particular model
instantiates consciousness should be understood instrumentally,
as a tool for rendering data relevant to models, and thereby in-
troducing the possibility of their progressive improvement. The
irony of our ecumenical approach is this: by embracing the
criticisms of computationalism leveled by anti-functionalists,
we can better ground the methodological computationalism of
Newell, paving the way for a consciousness science both meta-
physics-neutral and responsive to data.
An integrative science of consciousness
Notably, we do not intend to suggest that neuroscience, psy-
chology, or any other subfield of cognitive science needs to re-
form either its distinctive methods or its basic strategies for
model validation. Specific models in these disciplines may con-
tinue to be validated by confirming their predictions against
empirical data. These techniques are unquestionably
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appropriate when the explanatory targets are intersubjectively
measurable quantities like patterns of neural firing or behav-
ioral profiles. However, when it comes to consciousness consid-
ered as a subjective experience, then the standards of model
evaluation change. This is where apophatic models provide
value, as a means both for integrating diverse results concern-
ing consciousness-relevant phenomena and of testing claims
about the nature of that integration.
By eschewing any substantive position in the metaphysical
debate, the apophatic method encourages modesty. We treat
the success of any integrative model of consciousness-rele-
vant phenomena skeptically, as a negative datum that the
particular pattern of functional relations implemented in the
model is insufficient to account for consciousness tout court.
This failure then motivates a successor model that subsumes
an increasing amount of consciousness-relevant phenomena.
Methodologically, this process proceeds by testing conjectures
about what constitutes consciousness via implementation,
knowing that success in modeling, which is by no means guar-
anteed, implies a failure to completely capture the underlying
phenomenon: a “refutation by implementation.”6
Apophaticism in Practice
If the apophatic approach rejects the claim that computational
models may exhibit consciousness, in what sense does the proj-
ect of building such models produce knowledge about con-
sciousness? More generally, is apophatic model validation
genuinely scientific? We claim that apophatic science is struc-
turally analogous to paradigmatic instances of scientific reason-
ing found in physics. After elaborating this conceptual point, we
illustrate our view with some concrete examples of ongoing
modeling projects in cognitive science that may be recast or re-
formed as fragments of an apophatic science of consciousness.
Apophatic consciousness science as a research program
We offer apophatic consciousness science as a “research pro-
gram,” in the sense found in the history and philosophy of sci-
ence (e.g., Laudan 1977; Lakatos 1978; Chang 2012; Smith 2014):
a systematic and progressive project aimed at probing the limits
of theory by constructing ever more refined models. Considered
as a research program, apophatic consciousness science looks
much more like paradigmatic instances of scientific inquiry,
such as Newtonian astronomy or contemporary high-energy
physics, than the traditional, reductive investigation of con-
sciousness. As with any high-precision research project in the
history of science, apophatic consciousness science continu-
ously challenges the evidential support for its core theoretical
commitment, in this case, the power of information processing
to produce consciousness.
Likewise, just as the project of refining the evidence for
Newtonian physics was coextensive with the project of finding
high-quality evidence for its successor (Smith 2014), the project
of building ever more refined computational models is con-
structive both for supporting computationalism and for sup-
porting, even discovering, any successor theory of consciousness
that may emerge in its wake. So long as computationalism pro-
vides the only lingua franca for unifying evidence from across
the cognitive sciences into cognitive models, it is scientifically
irrelevant whether we take its explanation of consciousness to
be correct or not.7 As with Newtonian science in the 60-year in-
terval between the discovery of the precession in the perihelion
of Mercury and Einstein’s general relativity, we have no other
choice than to continue to probe the limits of the only inte-
grated empirical theory we have.
Of course, there is a glaring difference with the Newtonian
case. We explicitly advocate a skeptical attitude toward the em-
pirical adequacy of the computational account of conscious-
ness, whereas nineteenth century astronomers held out hope
that discovery of a new planet would explain Mercury’s appar-
ent anomaly in Newtonian terms. Yet our choice here is purely
pragmatic: as a matter of fact, computationalist theories of con-
sciousness have proved themselves lax in probing their own
limits, and all too willing to accept some particular robot or
model as conscious (see below). What Newtonian science and
contemporary particle physics exemplify is a strict self-disci-
pline, a project to demand ever-increasing precision in one’s
models without end, that we think computational cognitive sci-
ence would do well to emulate.
Existing research reassessed apophatically
Although some researchers have claimed that their computa-
tional models are conscious, apophatic methodology reinter-
prets this work as identifying what consciousness is not. In
particular, we claim that the ability to encode the core principles
of a theory of consciousness within a computational model pro-
vides evidence that the theory is incomplete. The apophatic
project does not interpret successful modeling of some con-
sciousness-relevant phenomenon as a failure, but rather as an
invitation for theorists to refine their views and for modelers to
encode this refinement in future models. We illustrate the impli-
cations of the apophatic perspective by reinterpreting the contri-
bution of some successful computational research programs.
Self-consciousness and the mirror test
An agent passes the mirror test if it attempts to investigate
some mark placed in secret on a non-visible part of its body
(e.g., a spot on its forehead) once it views itself in a mirror.
Passing the mirror test has been taken as a behavioral signature
of self-awareness, or even self-consciousness. Yet, Bringsjord
et al. (2015) demonstrate that mirror test passing behavior can
be implemented in artificial agents. Once we recognize that the
agent passes the putative test through mechanical theorem-
proving, the test’s relevance to “self-consciousness” seems to
evaporate. Similar considerations apply to other robotic suc-
cesses at passing this test, whether they employ simple circuits
(Haikonen 2007) or neural nets (Takeno 2008; Torigoe et al. 2009).
In a proto-apophatic manner, Bringsjord, Haikonen, and
Takeno all acknowledge their implementations reveal that pass-
ing the mirror test is too trivial to serve as a measure of con-
sciousness, taking their robots as a starting point for further
research. Yet, while Bringsjord is skeptical about consciousness
in artificial agents, Haikonen and Takeno argue that the robots
will achieve consciousness properly at a future stage of their
6 We thank Ljupco Todorovski for coining this phrase (personal com-
munication, October 15, 2019).
7 This is a version of a claim historians have made since Kuhn.
Abandoning a paradigm just because of contradictory evidence, or
modeling failure, is “what scientists never do” (Kuhn 1970, 77); rather,
only when a viable competing paradigm is available are they at liberty
to change allegiance. Our claim is that there is at present no viable
competitor to computationalism as a lingua franca across the cognitive
sciences, and some such lingua franca is needed if evidence is going to
be integrated from across different disciplines into unified models, as
the apophatic method demands.
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projects. Hastily, Torigoe et al. (2009) already declare victory in
this regard writing, “We have developed a robot that is capable
of consciousness and emotions similar to humans,” because it
implements a custom theory of consciousness (131). From an
apophatic perspective, we applaud the progressive nature of
these research programs, and take each step to constitute a kind
of victory; not in producing consciousness, but in demonstrating
an implemented theory of consciousness as inadequate.
Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and the Stroop task
Next, consider Stanislas Dehaene’s extension of the Global
Workspace Theory of consciousness ( Baars 1997) in his Global
Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) and its associated com-
putational models. A GNWT model of the Stroop task (Dehaene
et al. 1998) takes as input two sets of four nodes: one set stand-
ing for four possible color words and the other standing for four
possible colors. The neural network is trained first to distin-
guish inputs from either set independently, then tasked to dis-
tinguish those from the “word” inputs when interference from
the “color” inputs is sent, eventually learning the task after a
period of error and “effort” closely mirroring the pattern seen in
human subjects (Dehaene et al. 1998). Reflecting on this re-
search, Dehaene reasons, like Torigoe, that since his model
implements GNWT, it is conscious: “We call ‘conscious’ which-
ever representation, at a given time, wins the competition for
access to this mental arena (i.e., the workspace) and gets se-
lected for global sharing and decision-making” (Dehaene et al.
2017).
From the apophatic perspective, we must be more specific to
discover what this model reveals about consciousness. On close
inspection, the workspace of Dehaene’s model is a forum where
vigilance and reward signals can be integrated with input sig-
nals through reinforcement learning rather than explicit rules.
The model’s success illustrates on the one hand that the Stroop
task can be learned without relying on explicit rule encodings
(cf. Lovett 2005), and on the other hand that conscious aware-
ness is not necessary for Stroop-like behavior. We applaud and
encourage the project to develop GNWT models that encompass
wider arrays of conscious-relevant phenomena, but the apo-
phatic perspective views the claim that any particular model in
this trajectory successfully implements consciousness proper
as a hinderance rather than aid to pushing this project toward
broader empirical scope and increased predictive precision.
Architectures for consciousness
The direct descendents of Newell’s call for integrated modeling
are a series of attempts to systematically account for large
segments of human behavior within unified “cognitive
architectures” organized around a few core principles
(Kotseruba and Tsotsos 2020). Long-running projects in this tra-
dition, such as ACT-R (Anderson et al. 2004) and Soar (Laird
2012) initially proceeded independently, but have lately coa-
lesced around a Common Model of Cognition (Laird et al. 2017),
which both encompasses shared assumptions and identifies a
systematic program for expanding the capacities of a cognitive
architecture. These projects satisfy the requirements we lay out
for systematic, progressive model building; however, they are
not instances of the apophatic method insofar as decisions
about which patterns of behavioral data to reproduce next are
not driven in the first instance by the question of whether that
behavior is consciousness-relevant. Our own research with a
computational system called ARCADIA (Bridewell and Bello
2016a), which falls loosely in this tradition, more closely con-
forms to the apophatic method, as our decisions about how to
expand the model are targeted at a sequence of phenomena (at-
tention, inattentional blindness, intention, and awareness)
deemed relevant for approaching a progressively richer sense of
consciousness (Bridewell and Bello 2016a, b; Bridewell et al.
2018; Bello and Bridewell 2020).
Can an apophatic science of consciousness, realized in proj-
ects such as these, genuinely explain consciousness? We do not
claim it will produce explanations of how phenomenal experi-
ence feels, or why it exists. But these explanatory demands do
not have analogs in any quantitative science. If instead, we seek
explanations like those we find in paradigmatic disciplines
such as astronomy and particle physics, then the answer is yes.
Quantitative physics does not answer nebulous, unqualified
why questions; rather, it produces a subtle and precise knowl-
edge, of the limits of certain explanatory hypotheses, of the ex-
tent to which the world fits our best attempts at modeling it.
Apophatic consciousness science is no different. By following a
trajectory of increasing fidelity to neural mechanisms, simulat-
ing an increasing breadth of behavioral data, we carve out an
ever more ambitious and specific understanding of what con-
sciousness is not.
Objections and Replies
In discussing the apophatic method with our colleagues, several
comments and objections were echoed by multiple voices. To
clarify our proposal and to address concerns that readers may
have, we list four typical questions that we have received and
include our replies.
Is the claim: solve the easy problems first, and that will
solve the hard problem?
Canonically the “easy” problems of consciousness concern con-
sciousness-relevant phenomena, such as the reportability of
mental states or the control of behavior, that may be investi-
gated intersubjectively and explained mechanistically. The
“hard” problem is the problem of explaining how (or why) phys-
ical processes give rise to phenomenal experience at all
(Chalmers 1996).
Throughout our positive presentation of apophatic model
validation, we have deliberately avoided the terminology of
“easy” and “hard” problems. We are happy to accept a distinc-
tion between questions that may be answered empirically,
through the methods of science, and those that cannot. The
view outlined here is concerned purely with consciousness con-
sidered as a topic for scientific investigation. We do not wish to
deny that there may be further, conceptual or metaphysical
questions about consciousness that fall outside the purview of
science. On which side of this boundary does the “hard” prob-
lem fall? It seems to us that the literature is unclear on this
point, and this is why we have resisted the terminology of easy
versus hard.
Insofar as the hard problem is understood as the question of
how to empirically investigate subjectively accessible phenom-
enal experience, then we do intend apophatic science to make
progress on it—not merely, nor in the first instance, by solving
“easy” problems, but rather by systematically integrating piece-
meal models of “easy” phenomena associated with conscious-
ness into larger and more comprehensive models. Insofar as
the hard problem is genuinely understood as a why question—
why do certain physical states give rise to consciousness?—
then we do not pretend to address it here, because it does not
strike us as an empirical question. Why do massed bodies
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attract each other? This is not the question addressed by the
theory of gravity; rather it gives us a quantitative account of the
conditions under which massed bodies do attract each other.
How is this different from heterophenomenology?
The claim that there is any scientifically relevant “hard problem”
of consciousness has influentially been rejected by Daniel
Dennett. Instead, he advocates studying consciousness through
a procedure he calls heterophenomenology (Dennett 1991,
2003), which treats the verbal reports of subjects describing
their inner experiences as intersubjectively legitimate data.
Computational models of inner experience may be derived from
careful analysis of these reports, and then, insofar as possible,
checked against properties of physical correlates, potentially
rejecting or amending the models on that basis. The key point
being that verbal reports are not taken as veridical descriptions
of the mechanisms of thought, but only descriptions of a per-
son’s (imperfect) experience of those mechanisms.
For the most part, we agree with Dennett about the status of
data. Like Dennett, we defend the legitimacy of intersubjectively
accessible data as relevant to consciousness science and reject
any push from mysterians or dualists that these data cannot be
used to target consciousness at all. Moreover, we agree on the
evidential importance of verbal reports, despite the fact that
they are at most fragmentary and defeasible descriptions of ex-
perience and not necessarily an accurate report of mental
processes.
However, we disagree with Dennett insofar as he sees no
particular problem in validating models of consciousness by ap-
pealing to such data. Dennett views qualitative models of con-
sciousness as validated in a traditional manner, through
matching predictions with data: metacontrast masking and
Libet’s neurosurgical experiments confirm his multiple-drafts
model of consciousness and disconfirm the Cartesian theater
(1991, Chapter 6). An implication is that Dennett takes success-
ful implementation of a model that reproduces the full panoply
of consciousness-relevant phenomena to exhaustively explain
consciousness (ibid., Chapters 12–14), whereas for us, there
remains a principled evidential gap between the subjective and
the intersubjective. An apophatic interpretation of Dennett’s
hypothetical sequence of models would take them as progres-
sively shrinking the set of phenomena that are constitutively
dependent upon consciousness.
How do researchers stay motivated?
Some colleagues have expressed concern that our view is too
pessimistic. If every model that accounts for consciousness-rel-
evant phenomena will be treated as “not conscious,” then why
bother building models at all? It seems as if under an apophatic
science of consciousness the only way that a modeler can win is
to not play the game. Addressing this concern requires a shift in
perspective. Instead of asking whether a given model is con-
scious, we ask whether a particular consciousness-relevant
phenomenon can be modeled at all. Or, more broadly, we won-
der whether that phenomenon can be modeled in a way that is
integrated into a model that also accounts for other proposed
phenomena. Success is not guaranteed.
Moreover, success is by no means the most desirable out-
come. Consider another analogy with physics: the “discovery”
of the Higgs boson. The vast majority of physicists expected this
final prediction of the Standard Model to be confirmed and
would have been shocked if it had not. Anecdotally, however,
their heartfelt hope was that the Higgs would not be found at
the expected energy levels, or found, but with quite different
properties than predicted (Kolbert 2012; Madrigal 2012). Why?
Although the Standard Model is the most empirically confirmed
theory in the history of science, there have been conceptual
doubts since its very inception that it could possibly be correct
as a description of fundamental reality (Weinberg 1997). Failure
to find the Higgs, or for its properties to match predictions,
would be evidence for the successor to the Standard Model.
Without such evidence, in the form of disconfirmations or vio-
lated expectations, the search for a fundamental theory is in ev-
idential limbo.
Cognitive science today is a more exciting field than funda-
mental physics, in part because of the great uncertainty at every
turn. The possibility of consciousness-relevant phenomena that
cannot be addressed through the methods of computationalism
is ever present. On the one hand, this possibility challenges
modelers to simulate increasingly sophisticated portfolios of
conscious phenomena. On the other hand, experimentalists
may be driven to seek a class of phenomena that can be speci-
fied well enough to be a legitimate target for modeling but that
resists sustained efforts to encode and reproduce it. Such a dis-
covery would identify the limits of computationalism and could
point toward its most promising successor.
This observation also answers a frequently asked corollary
to the question of motivation: when does an apophatic scientist
know that they are done? We noticed a strong concern that
researchers might one day build a model of consciousness, and
the apophatic method would prevent its recognition. We sug-
gest that there are two indicators that the research program is
exhausted. First, experimentalists may no longer be able to
identify new consciousness-relevant phenomena, in which case
the methodological constraints of apophaticism will need to be
reconsidered, and perhaps abandoned. Second, computational
modelers may be challenged by a phenomenon that they can-
not satisfactorily capture. In that case, we may have identified a
feature of consciousness (e.g., a function, a behavioral pattern)
that enables us to reject computationalism as a viable project
and can serve as an evidential benchmark for its successor.
What if the model really is conscious?
One worry that has been raised about our response regarding
motivation is that apophatic science may overshoot its target:
what if an early model, while failing to reproduce known con-
sciousness-relevant phenomena, is nevertheless in fact con-
scious? It is worth reaffirming here that the apophatic precept
is a methodological stipulation. Asserting that all successful
computational implementations are not themselves conscious
has value insofar as it establishes a clear route for iterative
model improvement. It is not meant as a factual test, and in-
deed to take it as such would be to take on some of the very
metaphysical assumptions we hope to avoid.
Suppose a computational model achieves consciousness. In
order to be evidentially useful for a science of consciousness,
there must be some method for (a) validating the model as con-
scious and (b) iteratively generating more data (through testing
the model, or building successors similar in relevant respects)
in order to improve quantitative predictions. We have argued
above that traditional methods of model evaluation are inade-
quate to this task. So, the example is only relevant to the sci-
ence of consciousness if an alternative to apophatic model
validation that satisfies (a) and (b) is on offer. We would wel-
come such an alternative.
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In our view, the real concern behind the possibility of an
unrecognized conscious model is ethical. Destructively manipu-
lating, erasing, or storing in isolation from any stimuli—the
kinds of actions one might perform on an obsolete model—
would be construed as malicious or harmful if performed on a
conscious agent. We take this ethical consideration to be
completely orthogonal to methodological and empirical consid-
erations. We do not reject its importance, but rather assume
that it will be dealt with by the broader social context in which
the scientific community is embedded. Here, apophatic science
is no different from any other empirical project. If widespread
attitudes toward the ethical standing of artificial agents change,
then the permissibility of existing modes of research may
change, as it has in the case of animal experimentation.
Conclusion: Everything Old Is New Again
Consciousness is a phenomenon characterized by features (sub-
jective perspective and phenomenal character) that appear in-
trinsically immune to the intersubjective methods of science.
Two responses to this conundrum have dominated previous
debates. On the one hand, denial: reductive functionalism sim-
ply ignores these characteristic features, and baldly asserts that
intersubjectively available patterns in information processing
may be identified with consciousness. On the other hand, myste-
rianism: critics of reductionism have embraced an unsolvable
“hard problem” that falls beyond the bounds of science and
may only be addressed through metaphysical speculation.
The apophatic approach suggests a path forward: take the
intersubjective methods of computational cognitive science to
provide negative data on consciousness. We need not posit a re-
ductive theory of consciousness to make progress on what con-
sciousness is not. Rather, by constructing models that simulate
consciousness-relevant behavior by implementing conscious-
ness-relevant mechanisms, we can show in increasing detail
the space of what can be accomplished without consciousness
and thereby delineate the boundaries of consciousness as a nat-
ural phenomenon from without. In this manner, the apophatic
scientist systematically chips away at the cognitive, intentional,
and functional roles assigned to consciousness until all that
remains is either an empty set or a circumscribed core that can-
not be reduced to computational implementation. The former
case would empirically vindicate methodological computation-
alism, and arguably change our intuitions about its reductive
cousin, functionalism, while the latter would constitute a
“crisis” in consciousness science (Kuhn 1970).
The apophatic method is radical insofar as it rejects the im-
plicit functionalism that has dominated the scientific study of
consciousness. Yet it is conservative insofar as it endorses the
methodological computationalism that rests at the very origins
of interdisciplinary cognitive science. Consequently, we suspect
that much previous work on consciousness can be imported
wholesale into the apophatic project. It would be a mistake to
think there are no implications from the apophatic perspective
for how consciousness science should proceed, however. One
implication is that the project to find maximally specific neural
correlates of consciousness does not seem particularly impor-
tant, because isolated information processing mechanisms can-
not do much explanatory work in apophatic science, which
aims for richly integrated models. Likewise, there are implica-
tions for the practice of computational modeling itself. Isolated,
function-specific models cannot say anything about conscious-
ness on this perspective. Rather, only models that fall within a
trajectory of increasing precision and richness as part of an
expanding research program progress toward an understanding
of consciousness.
We wish consciousness science to take itself seriously as a
science, and this means holding itself to progressively higher
standards of precision and detail when evaluating the fit be-
tween model and data. Reductive accounts fail this criterion, as
they assert a link between consciousness and its correlates that
cannot be validated empirically, and thus cannot be iteratively
challenged and improved. In contrast, methodological compu-
tationalism, validated apophatically, is a project susceptible to
iterative model improvement, and increase in precision and de-
tail. The apophatic turn renders the science of consciousness
scientific at last.
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